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	Political theorizing throughout the modern era uses the term “coercion” and its cognates (compulsion, force) in so many ways that one may despair of finding neat conceptual boundaries for it.  Historically, as now, “coercion” appears to be a catch-all term, rather than one that clearly demarcates, say, acts of domination from acts of badgering or arm-twisting.  Typically, however, it is used to capture a way that agents with considerable power can constrain the wills, actions, opportunities, bodies, and lives of others.  Throughout this literature, coercion generally refers to the sort of power that states possess against their inhabitants, war victors hold over the vanquished, or even a church hierarchy holds over priests and laity, and husbands have sometimes wielded over their wives.  These uses suggest a sort of irresistible power, which can operate through various mechanisms, including physical force and violence, threats, positional authority, and social pressure.  Until relatively recently, few theorists paused to give a careful analysis of its meaning or conditions; more typically, they have taken for granted that the term is understood, and that the sort of power it invokes is evident when in use.
	There is an interesting story to be told about how the concept of coercion became a philosophical topic of its own.  However, I will focus here on the slightly different, later story, of how in the course of philosophical investigation, theorists came to find and distinguish two kinds of coercion, and then to attend to one to the virtual exclusion of the other.  In the process, I will offer some reasons for thinking that the bifurcation of this topic is significant, and in some ways problematic.  After elaborating the distinction between the two kinds of coercion, I will show that the recognition of a categorical distinction in kinds of coercion is historically locatable.  I will consider some of what can be said for and against the distinction, but I will be principally interested to trace how it entered, virtually unnoticed, into theorizing about coercion.  I conclude by highlighting a few of the difficulties that arise if one does not attend to this history.
	Contemporary philosophical writing on coercion as a special subject begins virtually from scratch with essays by Robert Nozick in 1969 and Harry Frankfurt in 1973, and a collection of essays on the subject in the NOMOS series, published in 1972.​[1]​  These pieces, especially the ones by Nozick and Frankfurt, generated numerous responses and a discussion that continues today.  While Nozick and Frankfurt both conceive of coercion principally as involving threats by one agent against another, Michael Bayles writes in the NOMOS volume that there are two kinds of activities to which the term “coercion” applies:

At least two kinds or varieties of coercion may be distinguished.  In one type physical force is applied to cause behavior in another person.  For example, one may clasp another’s hand and force his finger to squeeze the trigger of a gun.  Such “occurrent” coercion takes place infrequently….  In a second variety, dispositional coercion, one man (the agent) threatens another (the victim) with a sanction if the latter fails to act as requested.​[2]​

While Bayles holds that the former, force-involving form of coercion is less common, interesting and important than the dispositional sort, he nonetheless thinks it falls within the bounds of the larger concept.  Later writers, such as H. J. McCloskey, explicitly deny this:
I suggest that the core notion of coercion is that of power exercised by a determinate person, persons, or organizations(s), by the use of threats backed by sanctions in terms of evils to be imposed, benefits withdrawn or not conferred.​[3]​
Responding to the view that some uses of force are also “coercion,” McCloskey writes,

When subjected to force, one does not act at all; rather one is acted upon; things are done to one or via one.  … The person who is subject to force, the physical force of another, or to natural forces, has things happen to him. … By contrast, the coerced person acts.  He does what he does as a result of coercion….  [H]e chooses to do it.​[4]​

If McCloskey is right about this, then Bayles and a few like him are wrong about how to use the term “coercion.”  What McCloskey and Bayles apparently agree about, however, is that there is a kind of categorical difference of some importance between threatening to impose evils or to withdraw benefits, and the direct use of force to constrain activity.
	In the literature on coercion since Nozick, McCloskey’s association of the term “coercion” exclusively with the making of threats is clearly the majority view among theorists who have analyzed the concept.​[5]​  That is, coercion is these days widely regarded as necessarily involving the following elements:

1.  the coercer communicates some sort of proposal,
2.  whereby the coercer aims to alter the costs/benefits of action for the coercee,
3.  whereby the coercer aims to affect the course of action that the coercee intentionally undertakes.
Such a communication will suffice to coerce if the proposal is a threat and if the threat meets certain further conditions, such as that it is credible, significant, immoral, and/or that it renders him unable to resist, and/or succeeds in bringing the coercee to act.​[6]​  There has been considerable debate over what precise qualifications must be added to generate necessary and/or sufficient conditions for coercion; these debates are, however, premised on the view that coercion quintessentially works by altering or constraining the will of the coercee, and not just her body.
	Whether or not one accepts Bayles’ or McCloskey’s views regarding the status of force as a “kind” of coercion, the view that these are distinct categories of activities, and that threatening is the principal, paramount form of coercion, is a relatively recent narrowing of the concept.  Prior to the late 1960s, those who bothered to say what they meant by coercion would rarely draw any sharp distinction between threatening to use force and using force directly as forms of coercion.  For instance, Hans Kelsen directly connects the coercive order of the state to its use of force: 

As a coercive order, the law is distinguished from other social orders.  The decisive criterion is the element of force – that means that the act prescribed by the order as a consequence of socially detrimental facts ought to be executed even against the will of the individual and, if he resists, by physical force.​[7]​

Kelsen goes on to count as coercive acts those acts of state involved in detaining those suspected of crimes, detaining for protective custody, detaining of the insane, detaining in internment camps potential enemies of the state, and the confiscation or destruction of property.​[8]​  Christian Bay writes, 

“When a person wants to do something (or remain passive) and is forcibly restrained (pushed), we speak of ‘coercion.’  The same word is used also if he is still able to do what he wants but has to suffer as a consequence a severe punishment or the loss of a very important reward.”​[9]​
 
Dennis Lloyd writes in a collegiate primer on law:

[I]s law really conceivable, or at least possible in any practical sense, when it is not ultimately backed by effective force?  Certainly the force of law is and seems always to have been linked with rules which are capable of being enforced by coercion; the hangman, the gaoler, the bailiff, and the policeman are all part of the seemingly familiar apparatus of a legal system.”​[10]​ 

And lastly, in a somewhat extended discussion of coercion, J. R. Lucas writes that,
[W]e are concerned with the enforcement of decisions:  we are considering the conditions under which decisions will be carried out regardless of the recalcitrance of the bloody minded.  We therefore define force in terms of bloody-mindedness, of what happens irrespective of how recalcitrant a man is, of what happens to him willy-nilly.  Force, then, we say, is being used against a man, if in his private experience or in his environment either something is being done which he does not want to be done but which he is unable to prevent in spite of all his efforts, or he is being prevented, in spite of all his efforts, from doing something which he wants to do, and which he otherwise could have done by himself alone.  A man is being coerced when either force is being used against him or his behaviour is being determined by the threat of force.​[11]​
And:
[I]mprisonment is the paradigm form of coercion.…  Even if it were not regarded as a penalty, it would still be effective in frustrating the efforts of the recalcitrant to prevent a judicial decision being implemented.​[12]​

	The works from which these remarks are taken are more general in nature than those that have recently focused on coercion, mostly remarking upon the nature of coercion only in passing.  Thus they perhaps should be regarded as offering recitations of received wisdom and terminological usage, rather than considered opinions.  Nonetheless, the divergence of recent philosophy from the earlier common wisdom is unmistakable, and would appear to be noteworthy, even if it has largely gone unnoticed.  We may therefore ask two parallel questions:  why did these earlier theorists treat force and threats of force as jointly exemplars of coercion?  And why have later theorists pulled apart the making of threats from the use of force, and treated the former alone as definitively coercion?  I’ll give a too brief discussion of the first question en route to a lengthier, more detailed and critical discussion of the latter.
	The quotes from the theorists just canvassed suggest that coercion occurs equally when force is used directly to alter or constrain action as well as when one tries to inhibit or induce action by threatening to use force as a sanction.  A good way to make sense of the parallel here is to see both activities as uses of force: one immediate, one latent.  In both cases, the principal effect is to constrain possibilities for action, either immediately or in the future.  While force can be used to manipulate a body into various movements and positions (Bayles gives the example of forcing a finger to “squeeze” a trigger), uses of direct physical force are much more apt for inhibiting action by limiting the possibilities for action.  Activities such as killing, disabling, incarcerating, shackling, tackling, blocking, drugging, and stunning are all means of making many otherwise possible actions impossible.  These may all be called “broad spectrum” techniques in that they can prevent whole ranges of actions, in addition to preventing specific actions; being subjected to them can imperil one’s ability to do many things one might want to do.  Similarly, credible threats of one of these sorts of force likewise raise the possibility that whole ranges of potential actions – perhaps all action, if the threat is of death – will become impossible.  One who is able and willing to use such force can leverage this power by conditioning such threats on the target’s failure to meet the threatener’s demands.  So with both direct and threatened uses of force, a powerful agent uses that agent’s demonstrated ability and willingness to use force to constrain another’s possibilities for action, either directly or prospectively, and does so either for the sake of such constraining itself, or to channel the target’s choices of actions in a direction the powerful agent prefers.
	My positing a likeness of direct uses of force to threats of force is likely to be resisted for several reasons, and I will not be able to give an adequate defense of this picture here.  However, I can bolster this understanding of the relationship of force to coercion in a couple of ways.  One important thing to consider is the aim of the discussion in which the analysis of coercion figures.  One of the key purposes of political theory is to evaluate and justify certain forms of political arrangements, and in particular to explain what if anything justifies the existence of governments and the awesome powers that they typically wield.  One frequent justification is that the ability and willingness of some agents to use overwhelming force (or like power) against others gives rise to a need for mutual, rationalized protection provided by an even more powerful, omnicompetent agent.  Weber and others go so far as to suggest that a state’s legitimacy depends on its ability to monopolize the means of force and violence within its borders, since individuals must attend closely to the matters of who has the ability to coerce them, and what those agents want.  But individuals would hardly need protection against threats of violence if these were never executed.  The power involved in coercion stems from the willingness and ability of some to take violent, forceful means against others; similarly, worries about state behavior stem from what states actually do to people, not just what they threaten to do.  Both the state’s justification and its need for justification stem from this common kind of power.
	Yet, it may be suggested, the state need not resort to uses of force and violence just to coerce, at least not in general.  After all, states wield many sorts of powers besides those that require impositions of force on their subjects.  Many lesser threats and constraints, such as parking fines and license revocations, help generate compliance with lesser edicts.  While this is true, it does not undercut the special relationship of force to power suggested above.  I can bring this out by noting that, unless very special circumstances apply, the claim that X coerced Y implies a sort of “all-things-considered” assessment of the power relations between X and Y: such a claim will be undermined if, for instance, Y has equally or more potent means by which to pre-empt or fend off X’s threat, or with which to retaliate against X after the fact.  Force and violence are key – perhaps the key – variables in this assessment.  While one might be able to coerce without possessing a significant advantage in terms of force and violence (e.g., as blackmail is said to do), it is hard to see how one could coerce while being at a significant disadvantage with respect to these means.  That’s why it’s hard to see how, barring very special circumstances, one could in any meaningful sense coerce one’s government to do what it otherwise opposes.  (A person might be able to persuade, cajole, trick or otherwise lead the state to do his will, but hardly ever to force it to do so.)  As Lucas suggests above, incarceration is the lynchpin of modern state-organized systems of coercion:  it is a technique by which the state can forcefully and humanely stop those who would disrupt its orderly operations.  Such an advantage in force and violence is one of few trump cards – and perhaps the only one – that can give an agent, including states, a monopoly on the power to coerce.  
	The power to aggregate, maintain, and direct the means of force and violence against others is the sort of power that makes rogues, mafias, and states significant actors in political philosophy, and draws our attention to how best to regulate them.  Unless scofflaws are checked by some system that can impose its will upon them regardless of their inclinations, they will generate social chaos and lead private individuals to make coercion a private matter again.  The state’s monopoly on the justified use of force and violence gives it the power needed to check scofflaws, and upon this power and others like it the rest of the state’s powers depend.
	Thus it seems to me that theorists have had good grounds to regard direct uses of force and threats of force as both within the extension of the concept “coercion,” and perhaps definitive of it.  At the very least, there is use for a concept that refers to this sort of power, and the term “coercion” has for a long time been routinely used to refer to such power.  Yet recent analytic philosophy of coercion has come to associate “coercion” either exclusively or primarily with the use of threats.​[13]​  It is to the merits of this view I now turn.
	Despite the discussion above, I suspect that it will seem to most readers obvious that making threats – even threats of force – and using force for any purpose are distinctly different activities, and should be conceptualized as such.  The following seem to me the strongest considerations in favor of this view.

1.  Successful threats can sometimes be bluffs; that is, one can sometimes coerce another without the ability or willingness to exercise the kind of power one advertises.  Not so with direct force.

2.  While some threats are of force/violence, and others perhaps akin to force/violence, many potentially coercive threats fall far short of force/violence.

3.  As McCloskey argues, there is an intimate, ontological connection between coercion and coerced acts.  Direct uses of force against a body do not generate particular actions by the receiving party, and hence the question, “what was she coerced into doing?” receives no answer.

4.  Following on 2 and 3, the forensic issues that arise about actions in response to threats are distinctly different, and more difficult, than the issues that arise in the wake of direct uses of force.
Good bluffs make adventitious use of power lodged somewhere, in someone, and thus demonstrate that the sort of power one needs in order to coerce is not necessarily fully within the control of the coercing agent.  Yet while (1) raises many interesting issues I cannot address here, to my knowledge there is no extended treatment of coercion by bluffing in the philosophical literature, so this likely has not motivated the change in analysis.  The three remaining considerations combine to form a more likely impetus to a different approach to coercion from the one I’ve described.
	The emphasis of recent philosophy of coercion on threats, altered actions, and particular cases seems to derive at least in part from a very different interest in coercion than that motivating the classical political theorists.  Rather than conceiving of coercion as a decisive, possibly sustained use of power, theorists have more lately conceived of coercion as a quality manifested in certain actions which respond to some considerations rather than others.  There are several possible motivations for this turn, besides those mentioned above, but this conception appears to be most valuable as an analytic tool for answering questions about an agent’s responsibility or culpability for particular actions, or for determining whether one agent has treated another properly and/or has respected her autonomy.  The focus of attention correspondingly shifts from what the coercer does, and how, to why the coercee does what she does.
	Perhaps the best and most prominent example of this analysis of coercion is Alan Wertheimer’s Coercion,​[14]​ a book which sorts through numerous cases and develops a sophisticated set of tests for whether an action should count as coerced.  But even if Wertheimer and others are motivated by different questions than their predecessors, it’s not apparent, I think, that Wertheimer or any of other recent theorists understood that they were reconceptualizing coercion, diverging from earlier thought about it.  Nor does it seem that the implications of this divergence have been well or widely understood.  Intended or not, the seeds of this reconceptualization can be found in the earliest and most influential writing in the recent philosophy of coercion – Nozick’s “Coercion.”​[15]​  It is helpful to give some detailed attention to how this essay, seemingly unawares, redeploys its predecessors’ thinking about coercion in ways that sharply alter the understanding of coercion’s nature.  After taking up this task, I will conclude by highlighting some of the implications of these alterations for what we can say about coercion.
	Nozick begins his essay noting that it is an exploratory study for a longer work on “liberty.”​[16]​  He quickly offers the following five “conditions for coercion” for an act by a coercer (R) against a coercee (E):
	[P]erson R coerces person E into not​[17]​ doing act A if and only if:
1.	R threatens to bring about or have brought about some consequence if E does A (and knows he’s threatening to do this).
2.	A with this threatened consequence is rendered substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for E than A was without the threatened consequence.
3.	R makes this threat in order to get E not to do A, intending that E realize he’s been threatened by R.
4.	E does not do A. 
5.	Part of E’s reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen the likelihood of) the consequence which R has threatened to bring about or have brought about.​[18]​
After some minor refinements and the addition of two further conditions (needed to handle some improbable counterexamples), these five conditions are taken as granted, with the balance of the essay devoted to working through definitional problems with the key concept in these conditions: threat.
	In light of claims about “coercion” in earlier political philosophy, Nozick’s approach is noteworthy for narrowing the scope of the term to include only threats.  It also departs from its predecessors by making judgments about whether coercion has occurred depend principally on three factors: the coercer’s issuance of a conditional threat; a specification of the intentions and beliefs of the coercer; and a specification of the resulting actions, intentions, and beliefs of the coercee.  In emphasizing these elements, Nozick’s account ends up treating the power implied by the coercer’s threat – the basis of its credibility – as a kind of unanalyzed given.  Or, more precisely, the credibility of the coercer’s threat – and hence its power – is left to depend on whether in fact the coercee gives it credence.  Nozick’s account gives no place to the actual, historically demonstrated powers of the coercer or relevantly similar agents.  Hence broader power relations between coercer and coercee are obscured by turning them into facts about the psychological states and communications of the two agents involved.
	Although this approach is strikingly different from the thinking on coercion evident in earlier political writers, Nozick does not begin ex nihilo.  He says he obtains the raw materials for his five conditions from two now classic works of legal and political scholarship:  H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré’s Causation in the Law, and Hart’s solo work, The Concept of Law.​[19]​  The two works differ in purpose.  Concept offers a foundational account of the nature of law through consideration of the workings of society and state, given our typical psychological and moral strengths and weaknesses.  Causation, by contrast, is more of a manual for jurists, specifically those in an English or North American legal framework, who are presented with concrete cases requiring forensic investigation and resolution according to the established laws of the land.  The two works differ accordingly in their interest in and remarks about coercion.  Given Nozick’s stated aims, apparently realized in Anarchy, State, Utopia, one might expect his essay to have more in common with Concept than with Causation. Yet the style of Nozick’s analysis and the resulting theory of coercion are much more in keeping with the aims and thinking in Causation than that in Concept.
	The part of Concept Nozick draws upon most directly would appear to be a passage in which Hart describes how coercion works in a situation of a gunman robbing a bank clerk.
[T]o secure compliance with his expressed wishes, the [gunman] threatens to do something which a normal man would regard as harmful or unpleasant, and renders keeping the money a substantially less eligible course of conduct for the clerk. If the gunman succeeds, we would describe him as having coerced the clerk, and the clerk as in that sense being in the gunman’s power.​[20]​

This passage bears more than a passing resemblance to Nozick’s conditions 1 and 2, which highlight the coercer’s threat and its effect on the coercee’s incentive structure.  
	Superficially, Concept seems to understand coercion in a way that is congenial to recent theorists.  For one thing, Hart’s main foil here is John Austin’s “command theory” species of “positivist” legal philosophy, which treats the state as something like a gunman writ large.  So Hart labors to show that coercion could hardly be the only or principal source of law’s authority.  Rather, the well-functioning state requires broad voluntary compliance with its orders, since it’s nearly impossible for a state to impose its will coercively on all of the people who might otherwise be tempted to defy it.  Thus, while not abandoning earlier theorists’ claims that coercion is necessary for law’s legitimacy, Hart may be said to downplay it somewhat, and to emphasize other at least necessary conditions for the state to achieve power, legitimacy, and widespread voluntary compliance with its directives.  Also, as in the example above, Hart seems to associate coercion closely with threats, and not with uses of force per se, and repeatedly interchanges “coercion” with orders backed by threats of sanctions, perhaps even excluding any other understanding of the term.​[21]​  So in this regard, Nozick and later writers are consonant with at least Hart’s dicta.
	However, Nozick focuses on what Hart says about a threat’s effect on its target’s incentive structure, but neglects Hart’s sketch of the relative powers of the agents involved.  This seems to me an important interpretive choice.  The difference in power created by the gunman’s weapon is not extraneous or incidental to Hart’s use of this example to explain coercion.  To see why, it helps to consider briefly Hart’s understanding of the role of law in protecting individuals from scofflaws and deviants.  Although Hart denies that law is merely a set of orders backed by threats, he explicitly argues that what he calls “municipal law” (i.e., that of the state) necessarily requires the employment of coercive sanctions in order to establish rules for public safety and stability, and thereby make voluntary compliance rational. In a key passage, Hart discusses the minimum features necessary for a legal system to give its subjects a reason to comply with it, compatible with their mutual, peaceful coexistence.  After noting that, in general, a large majority of people in society is likely to uphold its codes voluntarily, and only a small minority likely to defect from them, he then writes:
Yet, except in very small closely-knit societies, submission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were no organization for the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the advantages of the system without submitting to its obligations. ‘Sanctions’ are therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given this standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system.​[22]​

Hart’s invocations of “organization,” “guarantees,” and a “coercive system” is significant.  For people to be able to risk voluntary cooperation with others, and with state orders in general, they require security against recalcitrant members of society.  Such security does not come merely from giving scofflaws incentives or ordinary motives to comply, but from the existence of an organization that can impose sanctions that keep malefactors in check, whether they wish to follow the state’s orders or not.  Regardless of whether the term “coercion” is properly limited to threatening activity, the real import of coercion, for Hart, is in the larger organization or system of coercion which both threatens and then follows through with physical sanctions. 
	This is even clearer in a different context late in the book.  In arguing that there is such a thing as international law, Hart confronts a “sceptic” who reminds that in the international context there is both a need for and an absence of a sovereign to coerce compliance with crucial laws.

The sceptic [about international law] may point out that there are in a municipal system … certain provisions which are justifiably called necessary; among these are primary rules of obligation, prohibiting the free use of violence, and rules providing for the official use of force as a sanction for these and other rules.​[23]​
Hart replies by distinguishing the situation of states vis-à-vis one another from the situation of individuals living in social groups.  It is his characterization of the intra-state context that is of interest.

In societies of individuals, approximately equal in physical strength and vulnerability, physical sanctions are both necessary and possible. … [N]o mere natural deterrents could in any but the simplest forms of society be adequate to restrain those too wicked, too stupid or too weak to obey the law.  Yet because of the same fact of approximate equality and the patent advantages of submission to a system of restraints, no combination of malefactors is likely to exceed in strength those who would voluntarily co-operate in its maintenance.  In these circumstances … sanctions may successfully be used against malefactors with relatively small risks, and the threat of them will add much to whatever natural deterrents there may be.​[24]​
	For Hart, then, what makes “municipal law” coercive may include the fact that it amounts to orders backed by threats, but it is crucial that these threats carry not just any old sanction.  In fact, they need to be systematic, organized, and backed by physical force, and must provide guarantees for law abiding citizens that their rectitude will not bring doom or devastation.  It seems fair to say, then, that for Hart the coerciveness of the state encompasses more than its use of threats, and requires at least mention of its willingness and ability to use such superior power to make good on its threats.  It is precisely this aspect of Hart’s interest in coercion that Nozick leaves out of his own account.
	Turning now to Nozick’s other source, his conditions 3 and 5 appear to be adapted from the analysis in a section of Causation that deals with what we might call cases of “undue influence.”​[25]​  Condition 4, the “success condition,” is also implicit in the discussion of these cases.  In Nozick’s account, these conditions describe intentions/mental states of the coercer and coercee, and also require that the coercee’s reasons for action stem appropriately from the coercer’s activities.  
	It’s fairly clear why, when confronted with a possible case of coercion, Causation should urge jurists to attend to the beliefs and intentions of the threatening and threatened parties.  One of its main concerns is to help jurists determine the etiology of certain actions, in order to determine facts such as whether there was a mens rea in a crime or genuine consent to an agreement, or for assigning responsibility for actions that have been improperly influenced.  In such investigations, an investigator may need to grasp both the typical and the actual beliefs or intentions of the parties involved, or an agent’s reasons for action, or the effects one agent might have on another’s incentive structure.
Of course generalizations about the way in which either the person in question or other persons respond, e.g. to threats, or by what reasons they are or are not actuated, have an important place in such cases. They may be used as evidence that a person in saying he acted from a certain reason was not speaking the truth (or was forgetful), because it was ‘out of character’ for him or is rare for anyone to act for such a reason.​[26]​

With respect to Causation’s concerns, coercion is just one way that agents may unduly influence each other; it treats threatening as one kind of “interpersonal transaction,” other forms of which include physical compulsion, hypnosis, and fraud.​[27]​  What these have in common is that, under some circumstances, they may suffice to shift responsibility for an action or event from the shoulders of the proximately causal agent onto those of an actor more remote from the event of interest.  Thus threatening, and its psychological aspects, are of interest to Causation insofar as they raise questions about who is responsible for what, in cases before the bar.  In adopting Causation’s approach here, Nozick’s account may be specially suited to help answer these sorts of questions.
	Causation, however, does not aim to provide a general account of coercion, and even the passages in Causation which Nozick draws upon for his conditions 3 and 5 do not mention threats, threatening, consequences, or anything that would be specific to coercing.  Given Nozick’s appropriation of Causation’s analysis, our question is whether the psychological aspects of threatening and being threatened are especially germane to a more general account of coercion’s nature.  Views here will differ, but there are at least some reasons to doubt that they will.  For one thing, people are likely to become accustomed to many standing threats (such as the criminal law), and thus likely to feel no special pull once they have adapted to their yoke.  Second, the account would seem to make ignorance a defense against coercion: if one is unable or unwilling to recognize that a threat has been made against oneself or one’s interests, then one becomes uncoercible.  What is ordinarily a form of extreme weakness would become a source of indomitability.  Finally, while sometimes psychological factors will be important in the outcome of a coercive situation, this is not always true: consider the bouncer who threatens the unruly patron with “move or I’ll move you,” or the gunman who is determined to gain his victim’s wallet the easy way or the hard way.  Just as in Aristotle’s case of the seamen jettisoning their cargo, some outcomes are not made voluntary just because a person’s will is their proximate cause; the fact that their cargo was lost at sea did not result from the seamen’s choice to dump it.

Conclusion
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